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Reasonable Expectations of Privacy & "Open Fields" Taking the American "Risk Analysis" Head On
James Stribopoulos*

In the United States, the Fourth Amendment has been held inapplicable
where the authorities enter upon private property and search an area beyond
the "curtilage" of a home. The United States Supreme Comt has concluded
that there is no reasonable expectation of p1ivacy in "open fields". In arriving at this conclusion, America's highest court reasoned that it is not uncommon for members of the public to venture onto private prope1ty despite
the presence of fences or "no trespassing" signs. This possibility, according
to the Court, renders any expectation of privacy in such areas objectively
unreasonable. As a result, the Fomth Amendment has no application to
searches which target private property beyond the immediate perimeter of a
home.I
In R. v. Lauda, reported ante at p. 320, the Court of Appeal for Ontario
refused to incorporate the American "open fields" doctrine into s. 8 of the
Charter. This holding is directly at odds with R. v. Patriquen2. In Patriquen, a majority of the Nova Scotia Comt of Appeal endorsed the "open
fields" doctrine in concluding that entry onto a privately owned woodland,
in the absence of a warrant, did not violate s. 8 of the Charter.
These conflicting provincial appeal court decisions suggest that it will not
be Jong before the "open fields" doctrine finds its way before the Supreme
Court of Canada. In deciding whether to endorse the "open fields" doctrine
in Canada, the Supreme Court should remember the theoretical divide that
distinguishes its jurisprudence under s. 8 of the Charter from the decisions
of its American counterpart under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Bill of Rights. This article argues that the "open fields" doctrine

'" or the Ontario

Bar.

l See Hester v. United Stmes ( 1924), 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (U.S. S.C.);
Oliver v. United States ( 1984), 466 U.S. 170. 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed. 2d 214 (U.S. Ky.).
2(1994), 36 C.R. (4th) 363, 136 N.S.R. (2d) 218, 388 A.P.R. 2 I 8, 27 C.R.R. (2d) 135 (N.S.
C.A.). The status of the "open fields" doctrine went unresolved when the Supreme Court
dismissed a further appeal based on s. 24(2) of the Charter alone, see 43 C.R. (4th) 134. 188
N.R. 232, 146 N.S.R. (2d) 74, 422 A.P.R. 74, [ 1995] 4 S.C.R. 42 (S.C.C.).
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should not be adopted in Canada as it is premised upon the perilous American "risk analysis" which the Supreme Court has previously rejected.

that privacy is the pivotal concern underlying s. 8 of the Charter, the Com1
has usually taken a much broader view of what constitutes an intmsion
upon constitutionally protected privacy interests.5

The Rejection of the American "Risk Analysis" in Canada

Ever since the Warren Court delivered the Katz decision, shifting the focus
of Fourth Amendment jurispmdence from property law concepts to privacy
issues, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have systematically narrowed the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection by taking an increasingly narrow
view of privacy expectations.6 The Supreme Court of Canada has rejected
this narrow approach because it seems "largely motivated by the social
costs attendant upon the application of the strict exclusionary rule in the
United States."7 There are no parallel concerns in Canada given the balancing approach to the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.8

In 1984 the Supreme Court of Canada was afforded its first opportunity to
pass upon the meaning to be given to s. 8 of the Charter. In Hunter v.
Southam, in deciding upon the purpose of s. 8, the Supreme Court of Canada looked to the seminal decision of the United States Supreme Court
under the Fourth Amendment, Katz v. United States. In Hunter the Supreme
Court held that, like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of s . 8 was to
protect people and not places. Towards this end the Corn1 recognized thats.
8 of the Charter protects an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."3 In time, the Supreme Court indicated that this is the starting point
for Charter scmtiny under s. 8. A court confronted with a privacy claim
must
... inquire into the purposes or s. 8 in determining whether or not a particular
form or police conduct constitutes a "search" for constitutional purposes ....
Clearly, it is only where a person's reasonable expectations of privacy an; somehow dimini shed by an investigatory technique that s. 8 of the Charter comes
into play. As a result, not every form or examination conducted by the government will constitute a "search" for constitutional purposes. On the contrary. only
where those state examinations constitute an intrusion upon some reasonable
privacy interest of individuals does the fovernment action in question constitute
a "search" within the meaning of s. 8.
The similarity between American and Canadian jurispmdence, under the respective constitutional guarantees, ends with a recognition that the protection of reasonable expectations of privacy is the purpose underlying both
constitutional safeguards. Although the Suprerne Court of Canada shares
the view of the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment

3canada (Director <d. !nl'e.wigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch! \'.
Sou1/w111 Inc., 33 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193. 27 B.L.R. 297. 41 C.R. (3d) 97, 84 D.T.C. 6467, (sub
nom. Hunter v. Southam Inc.) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, I .I D.L.R. (4th) 641,
55 N.R. 241. 55 A.R. 291. 2 C.P.R. (3d) I. 9 C.R.R. 355. (sub nom. Director of Investigations & Research Combines lnvestig(lfio11 Branch v. Southam Inc.) [ 1984] 6 W.W.R. 577

(S.C.C.) at 108 (C.C.C.). After citing Stewart J.'s view that this was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, see Kat-:, v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347. 19 L.Ed. 2cl 576, 88 S.
Ct. 507 (U.S. Cal.) at 351 (U .S.): Dickson J. indicated "I believe this approach equally appropriate in construing the protections in s. 8.".
4R. v. £vans.104C.C.C.(3d)23.45C.R.(4th)210. 191 N.R.327.131 D.L.R. (4th)654.33
C.R.R. (2d) 248, 69 B.C.A.C. 81, 113 W.A.C. 81. [ 1996] I S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) at 29 (C.C.C.).

In Katz9 the United States Supreme Court had held that a reasonable exception exists if two requirements are met, first that a person exhibited an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation

5see R. Harvie & H. Foster, "Different Drummers, Different Drums: The Supreme Court Of
Canada. American Jurisprudence And The Continuing Revision Of Criminal Law Under The
Charter" ( 1992), 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 39 at I0 I.
6see B.J. Serr, "Great Expectations Of Privacy: A New Model For Fourth Amendment Protection" ( 1989), 73 Minn. L. Rev. 583; L.A. Berner, "'The Supreme Court and the Fall of the
Fourth Amendment" (1991), 25 Val. U. L. Rev. 383 (1991): W.S. McCanish, ''Unreasonable
Expectations: The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment" ( 1991 ), 20 Stetson L. Rev.
435.
1R. v. Edwards, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136. 45 C.R. (4th) 307, 192 N.R. 81. 26 O.R. (3d) 736
(note). 132 D.L.R. (4th) 31. 33 C.R.R. (2d) 226, 88 0.A.C. 321, [ 1996) I S.C.R. 128
(S.C.C.) at 159 (C.C.C.), Laforest J .. concurring in the result. Also see R. v. Silveira, 97
C.C.C. (3d) 450, 38 C.R. (4th) 330, 23 O.R. (3d) 256 (note), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 181 N.R.
161, 28 C.R.R. (2d) 189, 81 0.A.C. 161, [ 1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.) at 467-68 (C.C.C.).
LaForest J., dissenting. For a discussion of the deleterious impact of the automatic exclusionary rule on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see J. Dawe, "Standing to Challenge Searches
and Seizures Under the Charter: The Lesson of the American Experience and Their Application to Canadian Law" ( 1993), 52 U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 39 at 49-55.

8The factors relevant to the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter are fully
discussed in R. v. Collins. 33 C.C.C. (3d) I, [ 1987] 3 W.W.R. 699, [ 1987) I S.C.R. 265, (sub
nom. Collins v. R.) 38 D.L.R. (4th) 508, 74 N.R. 276, 13 B.C.L.R. (2d) I, 56 C.R. (3d) 193,
28 C.R.R. 122 (S .C.C.) and R. v. Stillman , 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 , 144 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 5 C.R.
(5th) I. (1997) I S.C.R. 607, 209 N.R. 81. 185 N.B .R. (2d) I. 472 A.P.R. ·I, 42 C.R.R. (2d)
189 (S.C.C.).
9supra, note 3.
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be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. IO Despite this
relatively clear exposition, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts instead focused
on the words of Stewa11 J. who explained the privacy focus of the Fourth
Amendment by indicating that "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 11 These words have been seized upon to conclude that
whenever an individual assumes a risk of exposing otherwise private conduct to the public, the Fomth Amendment's protections will not apply.
The Supreme Court of Canada has categorically rejected the "risk analysis"
which taints recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.12 According to the
Court, these American decisions improperly focus upon the risk that those
guilty of wrongdoing have assumed, without considering the larger societal
concerns at work. The ultimate question is not whether criminals should
bear the risk, but whether that risk should be imposed on all members of
Canadian society .13 The question must always be framed in broad and neutral terms otherwise "all of us must bear the risk of such surveillance".14 In
deciding if a particular governmental intrusion should be tolerated by the
citizenry under s. 8 of the Charter, courts must consider whether the "particular form of unauthorized surveillance in question would see the amount
of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society."15
In Canada, the normative approach employed in defining reasonable expectations of privacy has insured greater constitutional scrutiny of state investi-

1()Ibid. Harlan J., concurring. The Supreme Court of Canada recently seized upon this aspect
of the Katz holding in articulating the requirements that must be met before an individual can
have standing to assen a territorial or spatial claim of privacy in relation to a particular place,
see R. v. Edwards. supra. note 7 at 150-151 (C.C.C.). Also see R. F. Belnavis, 118 C.C.C.
(3d) 405. 29 M.V.R. (3d) I. 216 N.R. 161, 34 O.R. (3d) 806 (headnote only), 151 D.L.R.
(4th) 443, I 03 0.A.C. 81. I 0 C.R. (5th l 65, [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 341, 46 C.R.R. (2d) 272
(S.C.C.).
I I Katz, ibid. at 351. per Stewart J.
l2see R. 1'. Sane/Ii, I 03 N.R. 86, 37 0.A.C. 322. 74 C.R. (3d) 281. (sub nom. R. 1'. Duarte)
53 C.C.C. (3d) I. [ 19901 I S.C.R. 30. 65 D.L.R. (4th) 240, 45 C.R.R. 278. 71 O.R. (2d) 575
(S.C.C.) at 13-14 (C.C.C.l: R. v. Wong. 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460. I C.R. (4th) I. 120 N.R. 34,
[ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, 2 C.R.R. (2d) 277, 45 0.A.C. 250 (S.C.C.) at 477-78, 482 (C.C.Cl: R. i'.
Wise. 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193. 11 C.R. (4th) 253, 8 C.R.R. (2d) 53. 51 0.A.C. 351. 135 N.R. 161.
[ l992J I S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) at 206-207 (C.C.C.), LaForest L di~senting in the rL~sult.
13 Duarte, ibid, at 17.
14wong. supra note 12, at 481.
15/bid. at 478.
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gative techniques. A number of examples quickly serve to illustrate this important point.
In the United States, a government agent is free to surreptitiously record a
conversation with an individual. The Fourth Amendment does not apply because everyone assumes the risk that a conversation could be repeated accurately in court, whether through memory or mechanical recording.16 The
Supreme Court of Canada, however, has distinguished between the risk
posed by speaking to a tattle-tale and the prospect that government agents
may be listening to and recording our conversations every time we speak.
"They involve different risks to the individual and the body politic. In other
words, the law recognizes that we inherently have to bear the risk of the
'tattle-tale' but draws the line at concluding that we must also bear, as the
price of choosing to speak to another human being, the risk of a having a
permanent recording made of our words."17
The same reasoning has been applied to video surveillance. In Canada, an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not spent the moment they
invite an individual into a private place like a hotel room. According to the
Supreme Court,
... there is an important difference between the risk that our activities may be
observed by other persons, and the risk that agents of the state, in the absence of
prior authorization, will permanently record those activities on video tape ... To
fail to recognize the distinction is to blind oneself to the fact that the threat to
privacy inherent in subjecting ourselves to the ordinary observations of others
pales by comparison with the threat to privacy posed by allowing the state to
make permanent electronic records of our words or activities. 18
In contrast, such measures would appear acceptable in the United States
under the "risk analysis''. If one assumes the risk by exposing a private
place to public view then reasonable expectations of privacy are lost, government deception is irrelevant to the constitutional equation. 19

l6see United States v. White (1970), 401 U.S. 745; On Lee v. United States (1952), 343 U.S.
747 (which had focused on the absence of a physical intrusion into a private place, emphasizing old trespass approach to privacy).
17Duarte. supra note 12, at 14. The court preferred the approach of American state courts,
interpreting privacy guarantees under their state constitutions, over the approach of the
United States Supreme Court in White, ibid.
18wong. supra note 12, at 478.
19see H{!ffa v. United States ( 1966), 385 U.S. 293 (use of secret informers, acting at the
behest of government, docs not intrude on reasonable privacy expectations): Lewis v. United
States ( 1966), 385 U.S. 206 (it is permissible for government agents to misrepresent their
identity or purpose in order to obtain access to private places).
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In the United States, police are free to affix an electronic transmitting device to a vehicle in order to monitor an individual's whereabouts. The
Fourth Amendment is inapplicable, as the police could theoretically monitor the vehicle without such a device, therefore no reasonable expectation of
privacy is encroached upon.20 But when confronted with the same issue, the
Supreme Court of Canada again rejected the all-or-nothing approach to privacy expectations that plagues Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
Court conceded that police could theoretically monitor a citizen's movements while in their vehicle through ordinary surveillance and the use of
sensory enhancing devices like binoculars. But the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a profound difference between "the threat to privacy inherent in courting the ordinary observations of other members of society ...
[and] ... the threat to privacy posed by allowing the state to electronically
monitor our every movement."21 State activity in the latter category intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and is subject to scrutiny
under s. 8 of the Charter.
This brief comparison with American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
reveals just how expansive an approach the Supreme Court of Canada has
taken in defining Canadians' reasonable privacy expectations. In the United
States, the "risk analysis" approach has been favoured when deciding
whether an investigative technique intrudes upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest. In Canada, in contrast, the Supreme Court has endorsed a more normative approach in deciding whether a particular measure
intrudes upon a legitimate privacy expectation. The Comt has been careful
not to automatically import American jurisprudence, developed in a different constitutional context, into its analysis under s. 8 of the Charter. This
difference in approaches must always be remembered when Canadian
courts are asked to adopt developments under the Fourth Amendment, like
the "open fields" doctrine.

The American "Open Fields" Doctrine
The "open fields" exception to the Fourth Amendment is undoubtedly bot.:
tomed on the "risk analysis". It is premised on an assumption that those
who own or occupy private property assume the risk of a passer-by wandering onto their open field and discovering their criminal conduct. That risk is
then equated with a law enforcement official entering onto private property

20 united States v. Knolls ( 1983),

21 Wise, supra note 12, at 207.

460 U.S. 276 (U.S. Minn.).
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in search of criminal evidence. This analysis ignores that the risk involved
in each form of intrusion is considerably different. In the words of Justice
Laforest, each possibility involves "different risks to the individual and the
body politic".22
No doubt Canadians accept the possibility that members of the public may
periodically walk across their property uninvited; the example of a neighbour's child retiieving a baseball that has gone astray immediately comes to
mind. That possibility is considerably different, however, from the prospect
of law enforcement officials entering onto private property to collect evidence implicating an occupant in a crime. In this latter situation, Canadians
would undoubtedly expect that the police would first obtain a search warrant. This type of distinction is not foreign to the Supreme Court of Canada.
In R. v. Evans23, the police had received an anonymous tip that the occupant of a home was growing marijuana inside. They were unable to corroborate the tip based on a check of criminal records, electricity consumption
and a visual peiimeter search. Eventually the police entered onto the property and approached the front door. When the appellant opened the front
door the police detected the odour of marijuana and arrested him. The
premises were then secured and a search waiTant was obtained. The warrant
obtained on the basis of the "knock and sniff' was challenged by the appellant under s. 8 of the Charter.
In Evans a majority of the Supreme Comt recognized that at common law
there is an implied licence for all members of the public, including police,
to approach the door of a residence and knock. The Court also recognized,
however, that the implied invitation extends no further than is required to
permit convenient communication with the occupant of the home, and only
those activities that are reasonably associated with this purpose are authorized by the implied licence. A police officer who approaches a dwelling for
the purpose of securing evidence against the occupant exceeds the implied
invitation and conducts a "search" of the home which must comport with s.
8 standards. 24

?')

--Duarte, supra note 12, at 14.
23104 C.C.C. (3d) 23, 45 C.R. (4th) 210, 191 N.R. 327, 131 D.L.R. (4th) 654, 33 C.R.R.
(2d) 248, 69 B.C.A.C. 81, 113 W.A.C. 81, [1996] I S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) at 29 (C.C.C.).
24/bid. at 33. But contrast this position with State v. Petty, 740 P.2d 879 (Wash. App. 1987),
where the court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy was intruded upon when police approached a residence, knocked on the door and sniffed for the odour of marijuana
when the resident opened.
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In Evans, once again, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the American
risk analysis, albeit implicitly. The fact that a member of the public, pursuant to the implied licence to approach and knock, might attend upon a residence and smell marijuana when the door is opened, was considered of no
moment. No doubt Canadians accept such a risk as part of the normal intercourse of daily life. There is a marked difference, however, between that
risk and the prospect of a police officer approaching a home to secure evidence of criminality against an occupant, in the absence of probable cause
or a warrant. This same distinction is even more compelling in the context
of "open fields".
Although an occupier of a dwelling is deemed to grant the public permission to approach the door and knock, that licence clearly does not extend
any further than the approach to a home. For instance, it would not include
an invitation to enter onto vacant lands adjacent to a home, such as a backyard. In fact, pursuant to provincial statutes and at common law, any such
entry onto private property would constitute an unlawful trespass. The risk
that members of the public might disregard the law and enter onto private
property should be of no significance. No matter how frequently this might
occur, the fact of the matter is that such conduct remains unlawful.
The need for consistency would seem to dictate that if the issue ever
presents itself, the Supreme Court should be compelled to reject the "open
fields" doctrine, given that it finds its genesis in the "risk analysis". A contrary holding would be difficult to reconcile with Evans and the Supreme
Court's earlier decisions that dealt with unauthorized perimeter searches. In
the context of "perimeter" searches, the Supreme Court has consistently
characterized any entry upon prope1iy surrounding a residence to be a
"search" meriting s. 8 Charter scrutiny, drawing no distinction between the
"cmtilage" of a home and "open fields".25

25see R. v. Kokesch. 61 C.C.C. (3dl 207. [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 3.119911 I W.W.R. 193. 121 N.R.
161. 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 157, I C.R. (4th) 62. 50 C.R.R. 285 (S.C.C.l: R. l'. Plan!. 84 C.C.C.
(3d) 203. 1199318 W.W.R. 287. 145 A.R. 104. 55 W.A.C. 104, 17 C.R.R. (2d) 297. 12 Alta.
L.R. (3d) 305, 11993] 3 S.C.R. 281. 24 C.R. (4th) 47, 157 N.R. 321 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wiley. 84
C.C.C. (3d) 161. 24 C.R. (4th) 34. 17 C.R.R. (2d) 314. 158 N.R. 321. [1993] 3 S.C.R. 263,
34 B.C.A.C. 135. 56 W.A.C. 135 (S.C.C. ). Also see J. Atrcns. "'A Comparison Of Canadian
And American Constitutional Law Relating To Search And Seizure" (1994). I Sw. J.L &
Trade Arn. 29 at 36.
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The Reasoning in Patriquen
Given the above, one is left to wonder why a majority of the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal would choose to endorse the "open fields" doctrine under
s. 8 of the Charter. Patriquen involved the police entering onto "a secluded
plot of land surrounded by woods in a rural area". The land was privately
owned and legally occupied by the appellants. In concluding that the appellants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the land that was
searched, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal placed a great deal of reliance
on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Boersma.26
On closer analysis, the decision in Boersma was only superficially analogous. There the police searched an "open field" which consisted of a parcel
of Crown land which the Supreme Court was careful to point out "was accessible to everyone." The marijuana which was being cultivated on public
lands could be seen from an adjacent roadway. Under these circumstances,
it is quite understandable that the Supreme Court would conclude that the
appellants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. In
Patriquen, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal relied upon Boersma to conclude that:
... the expectation of privacy on privately held woodland is not substantially different from that of Crown land .... woodlands in rural areas are in some respects
"subject to inspection by members of the public at large". See for example the
provisions of the Angling Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 14 which allow any resident to
cross on foot any uncultivated land in order to access a lake. stream or river for
the purpose of fishing.27

The judgment in Patriquen does not suggest that there was any waterway in
proximity to the parcel of land that was searched. Instead, the court appea:s
to use this possibility to trigger an American style risk analysis. Under this
analysis the risk that a passer-by might traverse the land is sufficient to vitiate the existence of any privacy expectation. Unfortunately, the decision ignores that this approach has been repeatedly disapproved of by the Supreme
Comt. In fairness to the Nova Scotia Comt of Appeal, however, it is important to note that it did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision
in Evans. As indicated, Evans would appear to make the applicability of the
"open fields" doctrine in Canada extremely unlikely. It is for these reasons
that the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Lauda, reported ante
p. 320, should be preferred.

26[1994] 2 S.C.R. 488, 168 N.R. 196, 31 C.R. (4th) 386, 45 B.C.A.C. 3, 72 W.A.C. 3
(S.C.C.).
27 Patriquen, supra note 2. at 372.
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Dangers of the American "Risk Analysis"
The judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Lauda is in keeping
with the Supreme Court's prior pronouncements repudiating the American
"risk analysis". In contrast, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's judgment in
Patriquen is premised on an uncritical acceptance of the American "risk
analysis". If taken to extremes, the American "risk analysis'' can have devastating consequences for personal privacy.
The most chilling example that reveals the dangers inherent in the recent
American approach comes in the context of aerial surveillance. According
to the United States Supreme Court, low altitude air surveillance of an individual's residence from a helicopter or airplane is not a "search" because
individuals assume the risk of such intrusions by commercial air traffic
passing overhead.28 This conclusion ignores, however, that in both the
cases that gave rise to these exceptions, the police made their observations
from altitudes substantially lower than that at which commercial air traffic
travels. In the one case, for instance, the police made their observations
from an airplane at 1,000 feet. In the other case, the observations were made
from a helicopter hovering above a greenhouse below, at an altitude of 400
feet.
In concluding that observations from the air did not encroach upon constitutionally protected privacy interests, the United States Supreme Court employed a "risk analysis". This analysis completely ignores the cost of such
air surveillance to innocent individuals. It is difficult to envision anything
more Orwellian than the prospect of state officials making observations of
our residences from helicopters hovering at low altitudes above our
homes!29

28sec California v. Ciraolo (1986), 476 U.S. 207. 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed. 2d 210. 54
U.S.L.W. 4471 (U.S. Cal.); Florida v. Riley (1989), 488 U.S. 445, 109 S. Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed.
2d 835, 57 U.S.L.W. 4126 (U.S. Fla.).
291n Lauda, in a footnote to the judgment. the Court of Appeal for Ontario indicated that
"For the purposes of this appeal. it is unnecessary to explore the constitutional limits of
aerial surveillance." See Lauda, supra. footnote 5. The British Columbia Court of Appeal
has already dealt with this issue, concluding that such surveillance docs not intrude upon
reasonable expectations of privacy under s. 8, see: R. \'. Hutchings (I 996). 111 C.C.C. (3d)
215. 83 B.C.A.C. 25. 136 W.A.C. 25. 39 C.R.R. (2d) 309 (B.C. C.A.). In contrast. the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal recently held that aerial surveillance of an individual's garden,
situated behind their home. from a height of 30 metres, intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy, see R. v. Kelly ( 1999). 132 C.C.C. (3d) 122. 169 D.L.R. (4th) 720, 22 C.R.
(5th) 248 (N.B. C.A.). Also see R. v. Cook (May 4, 1999). Doc. St. Paul 9814-0048-C6.
Edmonton 9903- 0904-CI (Alta. Q.B.), following Hutchings for aerial surveillance from
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In rejecting the "risk analysis", in favour of a more normative approach to
the definition of reasonable privacy expectations, the Supreme Court of
Canada was undoubtedly aware of the dangers inherent in the American
approach. In this regard, the Supreme Court paid close attention to the
warnings of leading American Fom1h Amendment scholars, such as Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam. Amsterdam cautioned against using a risk assumption approach because, given advancements in law enforcement techniques, there is a danger that the individual will be forced to withdraw from
society, "retiring to the cellar, cloaking all the windows with thick caulking,
turning off the lights and remaining absolutely quiet" 30 in order to ward of
the spectre of state intrusion. This eventuality has been deemed unacceptable by the Supreme Court of Canada which has insisted that "[s]ection 8 of
the Charter exists to protect privacy and not solitude".3 1

Conclusion
The "open fields" doctrine is one of many examples of the American "risk
analysis" at work. This risk reasoning is dangerous. It is capable of being
taken to unfathomable extremes. As the aerial surveillance cases demonstrate, it is easy to envision risks to individual privacy that can be employed
as a rationale for doing away with the constitutional safeguard entirely.
It is for this reason that the American "risk analysis", and the blanket exceptions to the Fourth Amendment which it has spawned, like the "open
fields" doctrine, should find no sanctuary in Canadian jurisprudence.
Canadians deserve more. They deserve meaningful protections from state
intrusions on their privacy. Protections that are not fleeting. Protections that
are not extinguished the moment the state is able to conjure up some theoretical risk to their personal privacy.

1.000 feet but Kelly for aerial surveillance from 50 feet! The Supreme Court has not yet
addressed the constitutional status of this form of surveillance in Canada.
30A. G. Amsterdam. "Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment" (1974), 58 Minnesota L.
Rev. 349 at 402. Cited with approval in Wong, supra note 12, at 477.
31wise, supra note 12, at 207, LaForest J., dissenting in the result only.

